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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Standard of Review
Interpretation of documentary language is a question of law. The Supreme
Court need not defer to the lower court's construction; rather, the Court is free to
make its own independent interpretation. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149
(Utah 1986). This standard applies to all issues.
Issues for Review
a.

Does the presumption against intestacy allow a court to disregard the
language of a will?

b.

Does making a will evidence an unassailable intent to die testate, and
create such a strong presumption against intestacy that a Court must
find the decedent testate?

c.

May a will which refers to real and personal property as separate and
distinct categories dispose of the real property without mentioning the
realty in any dispositive provision?

d.

May a court ignore an internal reference in a will to the fact that its
dispositive provisions do not reach all the testator's property?

e.

Does Utah recognize the doctrine of equitable conversion in wills?

f.

May a will effect an equitable conversion of real estate and dispose of
it as personal property without a specific direction that the property
must be sold?

g.

Does a statement in a will that a person is not provided for therein
prevent the person from receiving an intestate share?
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h.

Does the Will dispose of the decedent's real property?

i.

Does the Will dispose of the residue of personal property left after
specific bequests, or does it merely dispose of personal effects?

SIGNIFICANT

STATUTES

No statutes are determinative of this appeal. However, statutes of
significance include:
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-101:
Any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed of by his
will passes to his heirs as prescribed in the following sections of this
code.
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-101:
The power of a person to leave property by will and the rights of
creditors, devisees, and heirs to his property are subject to the
restrictions and limitations contained in this code to facilitate the
prompt settlement of estates. Upon the death of a person his real and
personal property devolves to persons to whom it is devised by his
last will or to those indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving
lapse, renunciation, or other circumstances affecting the devolution of
testate estate, or in the absence of testamentary disposition, to his
heirs, or to those indicated as substitutes for them in cases involving
renunciation or other circumstances affecting devolution of intestate
estates, subject to homestead allowance, exempt property and family
allowance, rights of creditors, elective share of the surviving spouse,
and administration.
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-603:
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal
effect of his dispositions. The rules of construction expressed in the
succeeding sections of this part apply unless a contrary intention is
indicated by the will.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a Petition to determine whether the decedent's Will
effectively disposed of his entire estate and to determine heirs of the estate.

Course pf Proceedings
Ryan W. Scarritt filed a Petition July 12, 1991, to declare that his father died
partially intestate and that he was, as one of two sons, entitled to an intestate share.
The Personal Representative replied to the Petition on August 15, 1991. No other
party replied to the Petition.
The Petition was heard by the lower court on the basis of oral argument,
without presentation of evidence, on August 22, 1991.

Disposition in the Lower Court
On September 5, 1991, the Fifth Judicial District Court issued a
Memorandum Decision stating the Will effectively disposed of all of the decedent's
estate. On September 25, 1991, an Order to that effect was entered. These orders
are contained in the Addendum.
These orders were certified as final under Rule 54(b), U.R.Civ.P. A copy of
the certification order is in the Addendum.

Statement of Facts
Ryan W. Scarritt is one of two sons of the decedent. The decedent was
unmarried at his death. Ryan W. Scarritt is therefore an heir of any property as to
which the decedent was intestate.
The decedent died owning a valuable ranch near Virgin, Utah, near Zion
National Park. The decedent left a valid Will. While the Will mentions
Page 3

classifications of real and personal property it contains no clause disposing of real
property. The Will grants the personal representative authority to borrow against or
sell the real property.

The Will Of Curtiss S. Scarritt
The Will of Curtiss S. Scarritt has eleven major Articles, numbered FIRST
through TENTH. The Will is contained in the Addendum. There are eleven Articles
because two are designated SECOND. Briefly, the purpose of each Article is:
FIRST-revocation of prior wills
SECOND-disposition of remains
SECOND-direction for payment of debts
THIRD-disposition of property
FOURTH-appointment of personal representative
FIFTH-directions regarding payment of estate taxes (subsection 1);
application of dividends and allocation between principal and income
(subsection 2); and treatment of bonds acquired for less that face
value (subsection 3).
SIXTH-disposition of "articles of personal, household or domestic use
or adornment."
SEVENTH-directions to personal representative regarding
operations of "my real property located in Virgin, Utah," and
authorization of the the personal representative to sell the real
property and some personal property.
EIGHTH-direction that the will should be probated according to Utah
law.
NINTH-explanation of no provision in the will for Donna Lynn Scarritt
or Ryan Winthrop Scarritt.
TENTH-<lirection that the personal representative consult with "The
Park Firm."
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Dispositive Provisions - The SIXTH Article
There are only two provisions of the Will which deal in any way with the
disposition of property. The most specific is the SIXTH Article which makes a
disposition to Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.:
SIXTH: I give and bequeath to my son, CURTISS S. SCARRITT, JR.,
absolutely, if he survives me, all articles of personal, household or
domestic use or adornment, which may be included in my Utah estate
at my death, excluding only such articles of farm and ranch machinery
and equipment, together with horses and other livestock, and such
personal property as may be selected and distributed pursuant to the
provisions of Article THIRD hereof.
This provision deals only with personal effects. It gives to Curtiss S. Scarritt,
Jr., "all articles of personal, household or domestic use or adornment," which are
clearly personal effects. The paragraph then goes on to exclude therefrom "articles
of farm and ranch machinery and equipment" and "horses and other livestock" and
other items which are usually not thought of as personal effects. The exclusion
does nothing to broaden the meaning of the bequest. This SIXTH Article also
notes that the personal effects CURTISS S. SCARRITT, JR., receives under that
Article will be diminished by disposition of personal effects under the THIRD Article.
The disposition of personal effects under the THIRD Article will be reviewed later.
The SIXTH Article is clearly a disposition of personal effects, limited by the
earlier disposition of personal effects in the THIRD Article. The lower court's
decision, findings and conclusions concurred with this reading of the SIXTH
Article.1

Memorandum Decision, p.4, R. 115; Findings fl7, R.130; Conclusions f14, R. 135.
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Dispositive Provisions - The THIRD Article
The THIRD Article is the major dispositive clause of the Will, containing five
separate included subparagraphs numbered A through E. The opening sentence
of the THIRD Article references the entire estate of the decedent,2 even though the
enumerated subparagraphs do not deal with that entire estate:
THIRD: All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both real
and personal, of whatsoever kind and nature and wheresoever the
same may be situated of which I shall die seized or possessed to
which in any way I may be entitled at the time of my death, with the
exception of the Horace S. Scarritt Trust which shall be administered
by a Trust Officer of Banker's Trust, New York, New York, I give,
devise, and bequeath as follows:
The ensuing subparagraphs are summarized as follows:
A. Disposition of approximately $150,000 of certificates of deposit.
B. Disposition of sums in the Ferguson Capital account.
C. Disposition of race horse related livestock and vehicles.
D. Disposition of other livestock and saddle horses.
E. Disposition of "personal property."
The introductory clause of the THIRD Article clearly refers to "real and
personal" properties of the decedent's estate, but no subparagraph therein uses
the term "real property." In fact, the enumerated subparagraphs A through D deal
narrowly with specific items of personal property. They effectively dispose of the
enumerated items - CD's, the Ferguson Capital Account, livestock and equipment.
The lower court's Memorandum Decision, Findings and Conclusions concur
with this reading of subparagraphs A through D of the THIRD Article of the Will.3

2

The opening portion of the THIRD paragraph excludes the Horace S. Scarritt Trust,from the
operation of the Will referring to it as being administered by a "Trust Officer of Banker's Trust, New
York, New York" when in fact that Trust conferred no power of appointment upon the decedent but
provided that on the decedent's demise that the Trust would be distributed to the two heirs of the
decedent, Curtiss S. Scarritt Jr. and Ryan W. Scarritt.
3
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Memorandum Decision P.4, R. 115; Findings 1f12, R. 131; Conclusions 1J9, R. 134.

Subparagraph E. - Personal Effects
Subparagraph E of the THIRD Article also refers to "personal property." It
reads:
E.

The personal property should be divided as follows:
1.

To Rod Orton - Black Ebony Sherry Set and a 4-10
shotgun.

2.

The distribution of the remaining items of personal
property should be determined by Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.,
Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park.

The Petitioner claims this paragraph is not dispositive of all the residue of
the estate. The lower court found it was.4
Other Provisions
After the dispositive THIRD and SIXTH Articles, the SEVENTH Article of the
Will is an authorization for the personal representative to "sell all real property"
together with all tangible personal property included in the estate but "not
effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof." The
Personal Representative is then directed "to add the proceeds of any such sale to
my estate."
I authorize my Personal Representative to sell all real property,
together with all tangible personal property and livestock included in
my estate and not effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD
and SIXTH hereof, at such time or times and upon such terms and
conditions as shall seem advisable and to add the proceeds of any
such sale to my estate.
The fact that Ryan W. Scarritt was not provided for in the Will was noted in
the NINTH Article:
. . . I make no provision for my son, Ryan Winthrop Scarritt for the
reason that he will be well-provided for, following my death, under the
will of my father, Horace S. Scarritt.

4

Memorandum Decision pp.4, 6 R. 115; Findings Kf14-15, 20 R. 131-133; Conclusions W O 11,17, R. 135,136.
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Finally, the Will requests the Personal Representative to "consult with" the
decedent's attorneys "in the selection and distribution of my real and personal
property."
TENTH: I request my Utah Personal Representative to consult with and be
guided by the advice of my friends of THE PARK FIRM, in the selection and
distribution of my real and personal property.
Sale of real property is not mentioned in that Article.

Page 8

SUMMARY OF RYAN W. SCARRITTS ARGUMENT
Ryan W. Scarritt claims that the decedent died intestate as to his realty and
as to the personal property residue of his estate. There is admittedly no provision
in the Will expressly disposing of real property. However, the Personal
Representative claims that the authorization to sell the real estate "at such time or
times and upon such terms and conditions as shall seem advisable" is sufficient to
cause an equitable conversion of the realty to personalty. Ryan W. Scarritt claims
that this precatory and indefinite authority to sell is insufficient to effect such a
conversion, so the realty remains in the estate, unaffected by the Will.
Further, even if there were a conversion of the realty by a mandated sale,
Ryan W. Scarritt claims the Will fails to dispose of the proceeds of sale because the
Will does not dispose of the residue of personal property.
The clause which the Personal Representative claims disposes of the
residue of the estate (personalty and converted realty) is a part of the THIRD Article
which reads:
E.

The personal property should be divided as follows:
1.

To Rod Orton - Black Ebony Sherry Set and a 4-10
shotgun.

2.

The distribution of the remaining items of personal
property should be determined by Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.,
Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park.

Ryan W. Scarritt claims that this clause does not dispose of the real estate.
Ryan W. Scarritt also claims that it is not a residuary disposition of personal
property because its context makes it pertinent only to personal effects. Ryan W.
Scarritt therefore claims that the decedent died intestate as to his personal property
residue as well as to the realty.
Ryan W. Scarritt claims the Will itself recognizes that some of the estate will
not be "effectively disposed of" by the dispositive provisions. The Will itself
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recognizes the THIRD Article was never intended to dispose of the residue of the
estate.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURT MUST RELY ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE
WILL TO DETERMINE THE TESTATOR'S INTENT

While the intention of a testator controls all interpretation of a will, that
intention must be expressed within a will to be given effect.
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of
his disposition. Utah Code Ann. §75-2-603.
A court, in construing a will, is limited to the language of the will. "A court's
inquiry in construing a will is limited to ascertaining what the testator meant by the
language which was used. If he used language which results in intestacy . . . the
court must hold that the intestacy was intended." Estate of Beldon, 11 Cal. 2d 108,
77 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1938)(emphasis added).
Even if intestacy results from the language of a will, that result must follow.
The court cannot change a will to avoid intestacy. The general presumption
against intestacy will not act in contravention of a lack of dispositive language:
[l]n order to avoid intestacy, either partial or complete, the court is not
permitted to put on the will any construction not expressed in it, and which is
based on supposition as to the intention of the testator in the disposition of
his estate. Estate ofCorwin, 86 Idaho 1, 383 P.2d 339, 341 (1963).
An expression in a will can only be implemented so far as its language and
the law allow. For example, this Will states it makes no provision for Ryan W.
Scarritt.
. . . I make no provision for my son, Ryan Winthrop Scarritt for the
reason that he will be well-provided for, following my death, under the
will of my father, Horace S. Scarritt. (Paragraph NINTH)
This is not an affirmative disinheritance clause, but a remark that the Will gives
Ryan W. Scarritt no bequest or devise. It does not express any intention that he
shall not take assets from the decedent's estate; merely that he shall not take from
the Will. Therefore, it is ineffective, by its own terms, to prohibit Ryan Scarritt from
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receiving an intestate inheritance. Its intention cannot be read beyond its
language.

Legal Limitations on the Testator
But even if this were a standard disinheritance clause, purporting to prohibit
testate and intestate inheritance from the decedent, it would have no effect
whatsoever on assets passing by intestacy. Such an attempt is beyond the
testator's legal power. When the testator attempts to exclude his heirs at law from
inheriting his property, the exclusion goes only to such property as he has
disposed of by his Will. Estate of Dunn, 120 Cal. 2d 294, 260 P.2d 964, 965
(Cal.App. 1953); Estate of Lefranc, 38 Cal. 2d 289, 239 P.2d 617 (1952).
It is settled that a disinheritance clause, no matter how broadly or
strongly phrased, operates only to prevent a claimant from taking
under the Will i t s e l f . . . . Such a clause does not and cannot operate
to prevent the heirs at law from taking under the statutory rules of
inheritance when the decedent has died intestate as to all or any of
his property. Estate of Barnes, 47 Cal. Rptr. 480, 407 P.2d 656, 659
(1965).
The maker of a will has no power over his property not disposed of by the
will. "A testator cannot limit or eliminate an heir from receiving that portion of an
estate governed by the statute of descent and distribution except by disposing of
the property by Will." Estate of Brown, 106 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Mich. 1960); see also
Powers v. Powers, 67 A.2d 837 (R.I. 1949).
The lower court rejected these constraints of interpretation, even though it
stated it did "not defend the draftsmanship of the will." The court admitted:
There are certain technical problems with the way the Will was constructed.
The order in which the provisions are stated causes some concern as does
the construction of the paragraph in section THIRD. Memorandum Decision
p.3.R. 114.
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But the lower court rejected the arguments of Ryan W. Scarritt as "hypercritical." It
ignored "troublesome" problems by finding paragraphs "misplaced."5 And it
rejected the Will's clear statement that all the testator's property would be "not
effectively disposed of by Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof."
The Court does not view this as any statement that the Testator knew that
certain items would be missed by the THIRD and SIXTH Articles of the will.
Memorandum Decision p.6, R. 117.
This Court should not indulge in redrafting of the Will as the lower court did,
but must give effect to the language of the Will, as the law interprets it.
The testator is presumed to know the law. If the legal effect of his

expressed intent is intestacy, it will be presumed that he designed that
intent. The inquiry will not go to the secret workings of the mind of the
testator. It is not, what did he mean? but it is, what do his words
mean? Estate of Mcllhattan, 224 N. W. 713 (Wis. 1929)(emphasis
added).

Memorandum Decision p.4, R. 115.
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POINT II

THE WILL DOES NOT DISPOSE OF REAL PROPERTY

Real property is not expressly devised in the Will. The Will refers five times
to "real" property, but none of those references purport to devise it.6 The two
dispositive provisions in the Will do not even mention real property, much less
identify to whom it should be distributed.
The introduction of the THIRD Article makes the distinction between
real and personal property.
THIRD: All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both real
and personal. . .
But nowhere in subparagraphs A through E of the THIRD Article (or
anywhere else in the Will) is there any reference to disposition of real
property. Therefore, the Will does not dispose of the real property and the
decedent is intestate as to any real estate owned at the time of his death.
Other Provisions of the Will Are Consistent with Intestacy As To Real
Estate
The Will contains a provision dealing with real estate which is consistent
with its failure to dispose of any real property. The SEVENTH Article of the Will is
an authorization for the personal representative to "sell all real property" included
in the estate "not effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH
hereof" and a direction "to add the proceeds of any such sale to my estate." The
Article specifically recognizes that the THIRD Article is not a residue clause and
that there would be real property which would remain in the estate after the
disposition made in the THIRD and SIXTH Articles.

Articles THIRD, SEVENTH and TENTH include these references.
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Property cannot be disposed of unless the Will (1) identifies the property to
be devised, and (2) specifies who is to receive the property. The Will does neither.
It states it does not dispose of realty.
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POINT III

THE WILL DOES
PERSONALTY

NOT

CONVERT

THE

REALTY

TO

The lower court declared that the Will required the realty to be sold and that
the proceeds would be distributed as part of the personal property under the Will.
Article SEVENTH of the Will directs the personal representative to sell the
decedent's real property . . . (Conclusions 1J16, R.136)
The testator also intended . . . that the remaining proceeds of the sale of real
property [after payment of taxes] be disposed of [with] all residual personal
property. (Findings 1J20, R. 133)
Without expressly stating it was doing so, the lower court invoked the
doctrine of equitable conversion to treat the realty as personalty. It was declaring
that the real estate, after mandatory sale, became personal property, and passed
under the Will as personalty.
Equitable conversion is a fiction. 18 C.J.S. Conversion §2. Usually, it is
applied to convert a vendor's interest under a real estate contract into personal
property. Utah cases have held that a contract seller of land owns only personalty,
even though the seller still appears of record as owning the real estate. By the
same doctrine, the purchaser under the contract owns "realty" even though he has
no deed. The doctrine applies only when the obligation to sell is absolute.7

7

This doctrine results in exemption of the seller's interest in the land from rules applying to real
property. For example, in Lach v. Zion's First National Bank, 746 P. 2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) a
judgment lien was unable to attach to land already sold by the judgment debtor under an earnest
money agreement. The Court of Appeals held that when the judgment came of record, the contract
of sale had already converted the vendors' interest into personal property.
See also Mired v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 399, 393 P.2d 791 (1964), which held that since "it
is not contended that the vendors did not have an enforceable contract upon which they could have
sued for specific performance," the doctrine applied to convert the record interest in real estate to
personal property.
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A Will Effects Equitable Conversion Only If Sale of the Realty is
Mandatory
Other states hold that equitable conversion can occur by will, as well as by
contract, if the will imposes the same requirement of mandatory sale that a contract
would impose.8 A discretionary power of sale is fatal to a claim of equitable
conversion.
The existence of a power on the part of an executor or trustee to sell realty
does not work an equitable conversion thereof into personalty unless the
executor or trustee is under a mandatory duty to sell the property in any
event. If the power to sell is left to the option, discretion, or choice of trustees
or others, no duty to make the change rests upon them, and hence no
equitable conversion will result. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Equitable Conversion § 7
(1966).
It is clear that if a will does not contain a mandatory instruction to sell the real
estate, the real estate cannot be converted and pass as personal property:
A direction to sell or otherwise change the nature of property must, however,
be both absolute and effective in order to work a conversion. A power of
sale, which is not peremptory and absolute, but may be exercised entirely at
the discretion of the executors or trustees, does not, of itself, work a
conversion. Page, Page on Wills §46.3.
Courts do not favor equitable conversion. Any doubt in interpreting this
portion of the Will must be resolved against equitable conversion.
The law does not favor equitable conversion of property . . . . Few testators
have any knowledge of the doctrine . . . or any actual intent to change the
nature of the property . . . . The presumption, therefore, no matter what the

form of words used, is against conversion under a will, Where there is a
doubt as to the intention of the testator, in a direction for the conversion of
land into money, the original character of the property will not be changed.
27 AM. JUR. 2D Equitable Conversion § 5 (1966) [emphasis added].
In the present case, the doctrine of equitable conversion cannot apply
because the Will contains no mandate to sell the land. The pertinent paragraph in
the SEVENTH Article reads as follows:

8

No Utah case invokes equitable conversion by will. Cases are generally from the Eastern U.S.
and are older.
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I authorize my Personal Representative to sell all real property, together with
all tangible personal property and livestock included in my estate and not
effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof, at such
time or times and upon such terms and conditions as shall seem advisable
and to add the proceeds of any such sale to my estate, (emphasis added)
This paragraph is merely an authorization to sell real estate. It is not mandatory as
the Personal Representative contends. In fact, it says that jf a sale occurs, it will
occur "at such time or times and upon such terms and conditions as shall seem
advisable." There is no specific schedule or commitment. The phrase "any such
sale" indicates sale is not necessary.
The lower court effectively changed the phrase "I authorize my Personal
Representative to sell" to read "My Personal Representative shall sell." The court
also changed the reference to "anv such sale" to refer to "the sale." The Will must
not be rewritten to devise realty the testator did not devise. The Will must not be
rewritten to convert realty into personalty to avoid intestacy as to realty.
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POINT IV

THE WILL WOULD NOT
PROCEEDS OF REALTY

DEVISE

ANY

CONVERTED

The lower court found Article SEVENTH mandated a sale, changing the
realty to personalty. Article SEVENTH indicates what should be done with the
proceeds of any such sale. Article SEVENTH says the Personal Representative is
to "add the proceeds of any such sale to my estate." This phrase does not attempt
to devise the proceeds or even mention distribution. According to Article
SEVENTH, if any sale occurs, the proceeds will remain with the "estate." The term
"estate" includes all the decedent's property, whether passing by will, by trust, or by
intestacy.9 To add the proceeds to the estate does not mean they are added to or
disposed of with the "residue of the estate."
The SEVENTH Article appears after the dispositive provisions of the Will. It
does not refer back to those dispositive provisions, but says proceeds of any sale
are to be added to the "estate." Since the Will does not say the realty or the
proceeds are to be distributed under the Will, the realty must pass in intestacy.

See U.C.A. §§ 75-1-201 (11) and 75-2-501.

Page 19

POINT V

THE WILL DOES NOT DISPOSE OF ALL OF THE
DECEDENTS PERSONAL PROPERTY

There are only two provisions of the Will which deal in any way with the
disposition of personal property. The most narrow is the SIXTH Article which
makes a disposition to Curtiss S. Scarritt Jr.:
SIXTH: I give and bequeath to my son, CURTISS S. SCARRITT, JR.,
absolutely, if he survives me, all articles of personal, household or
domestic use or adornment, which may be included in my Utah estate
at my death, excluding only such articles of farm and ranch machinery
and equipment, together with horses and other livestock, and such
personal property as may be selected and distributed pursuant to the
provisions of Article THIRD hereof.
This provision deals only with personal effects. The lower court found this
was a subsidiary bequest to the THIRD Article.10
The THIRD Article is the major dispositive clause of the Will. It contains five
separate subparagraphs numbered A through E. Each disposes of specific
personal property:
A.
B.
C.
D.

Disposition
Disposition
Disposition
Disposition

of approximately $150,000 of certificates of deposit.
of sums in the Ferguson Capital account.
of race horse related livestock and vehicles.
of other livestock and saddle horses.

E. Disposition of personal property."
Subparagraph E of the THIRD Article is the clause central to this dispute.
reads:
E.

The personal property should be divided as follows:
1.
To Rod Orton - Black Ebony Sherry Set and a 4-10
shotgun.
2.
The distribution of the remaining items of personal
property should be determined by Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.,
Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park.

Memorandum Decision p.4, R. 115; Rndings Uf17,18, R. 132; Conclusions 1J14, R. 135.
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It

The court found that subparagraph E.2. was a disposition of the residue of
the estate.
Subsection E.2. of paragraph THIRD constitutes a residuary clause to
dispose of any and all personal property in the estate which had not been
disposed of by specific bequest in the Will. Conclusions 1110 R. 135.
The court's conclusion that this is a residue clause means that a committee can
dispose of the residue of the estate.
The testator intended that the committee of three have power to dispose of
all items of personal property remaining in the estate after the specific
bequests set out in the Will were satisfied. Findings 1f15 R. 132.
Ryan W. Scarritt claims this is not a residue clause. Whether the Will
contains a personal property residue clause is important for at least two reasons:
a.

A personal property residue clause could dispose of converted real
estate, if the Will made a conversion of realty to personalty.

b.

If there is no personal property residue clause, the decedent was
intestate not only as to real estate but also as to all personal property
except the specifically devised certificates of deposit, Ferguson
Capital Account, race horse related livestock and vehicles, other
livestock, and personal effects.

Ryan W. Scarritt claims this subparagraph does not dispose of the personal
property residue for three reasons:
A.

Article SEVENTH recognizes Articles THIRD and SIXTH does not
dispose of the entire estate.

B.

The position and language of subparagraph E make it clear it does
not affect all remaining personal property.

C.

The manner of disposition under subparagraph E.2. is inconsistent
with disposition of the bulk of the estate.
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A.

The SEVENTH Article Recognizes the Limited Scope of the
THIRD Article

The claimed residuary clause is part of the THIRD Article. If it were really a
residuary clause, it would dispose of all the property in the estate not listed in
subparagraphs A through E.
But the SEVENTH Article recognizes the Personal Representative may want
to sell property not disposed by the THIRD Article:
I authorize my Personal Representative to sell all real property, together with
all tangible personal property and livestock included in mv estate and not
effectively disposed of pursuant to Articles THIRD and SIXTH hereof, . . . and
to add the proceeds of any such sale to my estate, [emphasis added]
If subparagraph E of the THIRD Article were a residue clause, it would
dispose of everything. There would be nothing "not effectively disposed of" for the
Personal Representative to sell. The lower court achieved its result by declaring
the SEVENTH Article did not mean what it said:
This phrase does not indicate that the testator knew certain items would be
missed by the THIRD and SIXTH Paragraphs of the Will. Findings 1121, R.
133.
The lower court said the SEVENTH Article meant nothing, since nothing "slipped
through" the THIRD and SIXTH Articles.
Rather, the Court views this statement as a boilerplate catch-all phrase
intended to apply to anything that the testator may have forgotten about or
anything that may have slipped through the provisions of paragraphs THIRD
and SIXTH due to a dispute as to the character of the property, whether real
or personal, tangible or intangible. Findings f 2 1 , R.133.
The lower court therefore nullified a specific internal reference in the Will in order to
find testacy.
This Court should respect the SEVENTH Article in interpreting the THIRD
Article. The SEVENTH Article says there will be property not disposed of by the
THIRD Article.
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B.

The THIRD Article does not dispose of all personal property

The "personal property" disposed of in subparagraph E of the THIRD Article
is really just "personal effects." The term "personal property" can have a broad or
narrow meaning depending on how it is used. The lower court held that the term
"personal property" should be read broadly in reading subparagraph E. 2. of the
Article THIRD. This goes against the language of the Will. Subparagraph E reads:
E.

The personal property should be divided as follows:
1.

To Rod Orton - Black Ebony Sherry Set and a 4-10
shotgun.

2.

The distribution of the remaining items of personal
property should be determined by Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.,
Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park.

The introduction to this subparagraph E does not refer to the remaining
items of personal property (such as cash, accounts, etc.) even though the
preceding subparagraphs A through D made specific bequests of other items of
personal property. Subparagraph E reads as an introduction of a new category in
the preceding list of categories.
In other cases where the Will disposed of the last items in a category it was
clear. In subparagraph B, which disposed of the Ferguson Capital Account, two
specific bequests were followed by a disposition of "the remaining funds."
Subparagraph C, disposing of "race horse related livestock" is followed by
subparagraph Dfs disposition of "all other livestock." These paragraphs show that
the Will used internal referencing to show when the last items of a group were
indicated.
In contrast, after the preceding subparagraphs A through D which each
dispose of personal property, subparagraph E does not open with a reference to
"all other" or "the remaining" personal property. Therefore, subparagraph E must
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refer to "personal property" as a new category in this list of bequests. The term
"personal property" is being used for a narrow category.
Subparagraph E is clearly not a residue clause for all personal property, or it
would refer to "the remaining personal property," not "the personal property." It is a
new category, first exemplified by the sherry set and gun. Because the
introduction of subparagraph E shows that the subparagraph deals with a new
category of personal property, and because the listed items in subparagraph E.1.
are personal effects, the testator intended all of subparagraph E to deal with
personal effects.
Therefore, subparagraph E.2. has the limited effect of disposing of the
remaining personal effects after the sherry set and shotgun have been given to Rod
Orton. Its reference to the "remaining personal property" is in the limited sphere of
"remaining personal effects."

C.

The Manner of Disposition in Subparagraph E.2. Indicates It
Has a Limited Scope.

The manner of disposition specified in subparagraph E.2. is consistent with
its limited subject matter. Subparagraph E.2. does not name the recipients of the
remaining personal effects, but merely gives the disposition of those effects into the
discretion of Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton and James M. Park. It
therefore resembles a common method of disposing of miscellaneous personal
effects, divided up as close friends may agree. If subparagraph E.2. was intended
to dispose of a residue of personal property, instead of a residue of personal
effects, it would have named specific recipients, instead of delegating disposition to
the unbridled discretion of a committee.
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D.

Evaluation of the Will with a Specific Example Reveals
Subparagraph E.2. is Not a Residue Clause.

Examination of the treatment of livestock in the Will provides a clear
illustration of the flow of the Will. Subparagraph E.2. appears in its proper limited
function in the examination.
The Livestock Illustration
AHLivgsjggk
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* .. ,

.

,

L •N

•

it

L.

/

Article, where subparagraph C gives race horse
related livestock" to Don Randall and subparagraph
n
n
*

D. gives "other livestock" to Pete Heaton.

R a c e Horse

\

Don Randall

/ Related Uvestock \ — * *
[
]
V

Other Livestock

V

/

Pete Heaton

y

Between these two categories of livestock — 'race horse related* and 'other — all
livestock are devised. But the SEVENTH Article says there may be livestock "not
disposed of," which can be sold. The Will anticipates that a specific bequest to
Randall or Heaton might fail. This could occur if either of them had predeceased
the decedent.
If subparagraph E.2. were truly a residue clause for all remaining personal
property, it would dispose of any failed bequest to Randall or Heaton. The
SEVENTH Article could never operate upon any 'livestock not effectively disposed
of by Article THIRD' because the purported residue clause — subparagraph E.2. —
would dispose of it before the SEVENTH Article came into play.
The lower court has held that subparagraph E.2. is a residue clause for the
proceeds of realty, and for all personalty, but this denies effect to the language of
the SEVENTH Article. The SEVENTH Article is made superfluous, and the
reference to property "not effectively disposed of" is made meaningless by the
court's order that all residue property would be "caught" by the net of subparagraph
E.2.
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To specifically illustrate, if Mr. Heaton
had predeceased Mr. Scarritt, the bequest to
Heaton would fail. According to the lower
court's ruling, the "other livestock" would then
pass through the THIRD Article (untouched by
subparagraph E.2.) to be sold by the authority
of the SEVENTH Article. Then, by the court's
ruling, the proceeds of the sale of the
"livestock not effectively disposed of" would
return to be governed by subparagraph E.2. of
the THIRD Article. This does not make sense.

SEVENTH

The lower court's holding that subparagraph E.2. is a residue clause for
personal property in a broad sense fails because the SEVENTH Article specifically
recognizes that there would be personal property not effectively disposed of by
subparagraph E.2. of the THIRD Article. The Will is consistent only if subparagraph
E.2. is interpreted as a personal effects residue clause. The decedent is intestate
as to all personal property except that disposed of by the specific bequests.
CONCLUSION
The lower court determined that the Will disposed of the decedent's entire
estate, real and personal. Since it is admitted that the Will does not expressly dispose
of realty, the Court was forced to find the Will converted the realty to personalty, and
that the real property was disposed of as if it were personal property.
The flaw in the lower court's ruling is that the Will does not mandate sale of the
real estate, which is a requirement for equitable conversion to be implemented. The
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lower court did not find that the Will mandated sale of the realty and it in fact is not
mandated. Therefore, the decedent was intestate as to his real estate.
Further, the decedent was intestate as to his personal property residue. While
the Will disposes of certain specific items of personal property, there is no clause
effectively disposing of the remaining personal property. The lower court found that a
clause disposing of the decedent's remaining personal effects disposed of the
personal property residue. But this interpretation contradicts another provision of the
Will which recognizes that there will be personal property "not disposed of" by that very
clause which the lower court found to be a residue disposition.
Ryan W. Scarritt asks that the Court declare the decedent intestate as to his real
property and the residue of his personal property.
DATED THIS

of January, 1992.
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
A Professional Corporation

DAVID NUFFER
Attorney for Petitioner
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

of January, 1992, I served four

copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF on the following by depositing them in
the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
MICHAEL M. LATER
GREGORY M. HESS
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P. O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

MICHAEL W. PARK
THE PARK FIRM
2 West St. George Boulevard
Ancestor Square Towers Bldg., No 32
P.O. Box 2438
St. George, UT 84770

David Nuffer
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1

Order Of Formal Probate of Will, Construction of Will,
Imposition of Supervised Administration, and Denial of
Petition for Declaration of Partial Intestacy

2

Order Certifying Memorandum Decision under Rule 54(b)

3

Will of Curtiss S. Scarritt

4

Memorandum Decision
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL

ADIODBICT

IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate

)

of

)

CURTISS S. SCARRITT,

)

Deceased.

)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Probate No. 913500084

This matter came before the Court on August 22nd, 1991,
for argument on a Petition of Ryan W. Scarritt for Formal Probate of
the Will, Construction of the Will, Declaration of Partial Intestacy,
and Supervised Administration.
counsel, David Nuffer.

Mr. Scarritt was represented by his

The personal representative, Rodney K. Orton

was present with his counsel, Michael M. Later and Michael W. Park.
Mr. Russell Gallian appeared and participated on behalf of Milly
Heaton, one of the devisees in the Will.
The Court received oral argument in the matter.

It

appears that the parries have agreed that the Will should be formally
probated rather than informally probated.
Will admitted to forral probate.

The Court now Orders the

It further appears that the parties

have agreed that supervised administration is appropriate although
there appears to be a dispute as to the assets to be included in the
administration.

The Court now Orders the administation of the estate

to be supervised subject to later modification upon specific motion to
limit that supervision.

Following oral argument on the matter the Court took the
matter under submission and having now reviewed the file and the Will
and being fully advised in the premises the Court now enters the
following Decision and Order.
The resolution of the issues in the Petition by Ryan W.
Scarritt depends upon the construction which this Court gives to the
Last Will and Testament of Curriss S. Scarritt.

The Last Will and

Testament was received at the hearing as Court's Exhibit number 1.
The Court is aware that in construing the Will of the decedent it must
take into consideration that there is a strong presumption in favor of
testacy and against intestacy.

This presumption makes considerable

sense since one can presume that if the testator took the effort to go
to an attorney to try to arrange his affairs prior to his death and to
have a document drafted which would dictate how his assets were to be
handled following his death, ne would intend that the document dispose
of all of his assets.

The Court is also aware that it is the burden

of the petitioners in this case to demonstrate that the only
reasonable interpretation of the Will leads to a finding of
intestacy.

If there is a reasonable interpretation of the Will which

leads to testacy rather than intestacy then the Court is obligated to
adopt the reasonable interpretation leading to a finding of testacy.
The Court is likewise aware that it is the intent of the testator
which should govern in these proceedings so far as that intent is
demonstrated by the contents of the Will.

Resort to extrinsic

* r;

evidence is permitted only when the testator attempts to state his
intention in the Will but does so ambiguously.

Resort to extrinsic

evidence is then premitted in an attempt to clarify his intention.
Resort to extrinsic evidence is not permitted to supply terms or
provisions which were omitted from the Will.
With these principals in mind the Court finds that Curtiss
S. Scarritt did in fact die testate as to all of his property.

The

Court finds that there is a reasonable interpretation of the Will
which would include all of the property in the Scarritt estate within
the dispositive provisions of the Will.
not defend the draftsmanship of the Will.

In so finding the Court does
There are certain technical

problems with the way the Will was constructed.

The order in which

the provisions are stated causes some concern as does the construction
of the paragraph in section THIRD.

However these technical problems

with the Will should not be applied in such a hypercritical fashion as
to defeat the obvious intent of the testator.
Specifically this Court finds that the testator in
Paragraph NINTH of the Will stated his express intent to make no
provision for his son Ryan Winthrop Scarritt for the reason that Ryan
was or would be well provided for under the Will of Horace S.
Scarritt.

That statement of the testator's intent is crystal clear.

Were the Court to find that Mr. Scarritt intended to die intestate, it
would be in direct contravention of the express provisions of
paragraph NINTH.

i±4

In paragraph THIRD the testator attempted to dispose of
all real or personal property which he might possess at the time of
his death with the exception of the Horace S. Scarritt Trust.

The

construction of this paragraph causes some concern but it is clear
that he intended to give individual bequests to certain parties who
are listed in sub-paragraphs A, B, C, D and E.

The Court finds that

sub-paragraph (E)[2] creates a valid power of appointment in a
committee of three persons, Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton,
the personal representative and James M. Park, Attorney at Law and
author of the Will.

That committee of three has the power to dispose

of all items of personal property remaining in the estate after the
specific bequests set out in the Will have been satisfied.
Somewhat troublesome is the fact that thereafter in
paragraph SIXTH there is again a specific bequest of certain items of
personal property.

Petitioner has argued that this indicates that

paragraph (E)[2] was not intended to dispose of all items of personal
property.

The Court finds that paragraph SIXTH is simply misplaced in

the Will.

It was obviously intended as an additional individual

bequest subject to the provisions of paragraph THIRD.

The fact that

this specific and individual bequest was included in a separate
paragraph should not be seen as an indicator that the testator did not
mean what he said in paragraph THIRD (E)[2].

.is

In summary, the Court finds that the testator intended to
accomplish the following by the provisions of his Will.
After providing for revocation of any other wills and
codicils and directing that his body be cremated and that his debts
and funeral expenses be paid, the testator attempted to dispose of all
of his property by individual bequests and by placing anything
remaining in the hands of the committee of three to dispose of as they
saw fit.

It is significant that he included in that committee two of

his close friends and his son.

The Court finds that paragraph (E)[2]

of the Will was intended as a residuary clause to dispose of any and
all personal property in the estate which had not been disposed of by
specific bequest in the Will.

In paragraph FOURTH the testator

appoints his friend to act as personal representative without bond.
In paragraph FIFTH the testator attempted to establish a plan for the
payment of estate taxes.

The Court finds that it was the intent of

the testator that any estate taxes charged against assets passing
under the Will should be paid as a debt of the estate rather than paid
by the devisees.
In paragraph SEVENTH the testator established the method
for payment of the debts of the estate including estate taxes.

That

method was for the personal representative to borrow monies against
his considerable real properties located in Virgin, Utah and to keep
that operation running until such time as the personal representative
could with all prudence sell the property.

The Court finds that it

was the intention of the testator that the property be sold but that

-is

he has given the personal representative reasonable discretion and
latitude in deciding how to accomplish the sale and to establish the
timing of the sale to maximize the price.

It is the finding of the

Court that the testator's desire was that his ranch be sold, that the
proceeds be used to pay estate taxes and that any remaining proceeds
be disposed of by the provisions of paragraph THIRD, or placed in the
hands of the committee of three for disposition.
In paragraph SEVENTH there is a catch-all phrase which the
testator included which authorizes the personal representative to sell
all real property and all tangible personal property and livestock
which are included in his estate and not previously disposed of
pusuant to the THIRD and SIXTH articles of the Will.

The Court does

not view this as any statement that the testator knew that certain
items would be missed by the THIRD and SIXTH articles of the Will.
Rather the Court views this as a boilerplate catch-all phrase intended
to apply to anything that the testator may have forgotten about or
anything that may have slipped through the provisions of paragraphs
THIRD and SIXTH due to a dispute as to the character of the property,
whether personal or real, tangible or intangible.

±f

Accordingly the Court finds that the Will can be
reasonably interpreted so as to avoid intestacy and declines to accept
as the only reasonable interpretation the interpretation urged by the
Petitioner that the decedent died partially intestate.
for Declaration of Partial Intestacy is Denied.

The Petition

The assets of the

decedent should all pass to successors in interest pursuant to the
express provisions of the Will.
DATED this

^

~~

day of

^^AUHA^J^^^

1991

Fifth District" Judge

is

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on this

^ -

day of

SA^ak/U

1991, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing MEMORANDUM
DECISION was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, or hand delivered to
the following:

David Nuffer, Esq.
90 East 200 North
St. George, UT 84770

Michael W. Park, Esq.
Ancestor Sq. Towers Bldg. #32
2 West St. George Blvd.
St. George, UT 84770

Michael M. Later, Esq..
P. O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

Russell J. Gallian, Esq.
One South Main Street
St. George, UT 84770

Carolyn Smitherman
Court Administrative Executive

Order Of Formal Probate of Will,
Construction of Will, Imposition of
Supervised Administration,
and Denial of Petition for
Declaration of Partial Intestacy
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Michael M. Later (3728)
Gregory M. Hess (5611)
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840
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Michael W. Park (2516)
THE PARK FIRM (P.C.)
2 West St. George Boulevard
Ancestor Square Towers Bldg., Suite 32
P.O. Box 2438
St. George, Utah 84771
Telephone: (801) 673-8689
Attorneys for Rodney K. Orton, in his
capacity as Personal Representative

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
CURTISS S. SCARRITT,

Deceased.

ORDER OF FORMAL PROBATE OF
WILL, CONSTRUCTION OF WILL,
IMPOSITION OF SUPERVISED
ADMINISTRATION, AND DENIAL
OF PETITION FOR DECLARATION
OF PARTIAL INTESTACY
Probate No. 913500084
The Honorable J. Philip Eves

The Petition of Ryan W. Scarritt for Formal Probate of
Will, Construction of Will, Declaration of Partial Intestacy, and
Supervised Administration (the "Petition") came before the Court
for hearing on August 22, 1991.

David Nuffer appeared on behalf

of petitioner Ryan W. Scarritt.

Michael M. Later and Michael W.

rs,C,

Park appeared on behalf of the personal representative, Rodney K.
Orton.

Russell Gallian appeared on behalf of devisee Betsy Cheney,
The Court, having heard oral argument, having carefully

considered the briefs and submissions of the parties, and having
entered its Memorandum Decision on September 5, 1991, finds as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The decedent died on June 5, 1991, domiciled in

Washington County, State of Utah.
2.

This proceeding was commenced within the time period

provided by law.
3.

Venue is proper.

4.

The required notice has been given or waived.

5.

The testamentary instrument to which the Petition

relates, the Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S. Scarritt, dated
May 29, 1991, is the decedent's last will.
6.

The Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S. Scarritt,

dated May 29, 1991, was validly executed.
7.

The parties have agreed that the Will should be

formally probated.
8.

The parties appear to have agreed that supervised

administration of the estate is appropriate although there appears
to be a dispute

as to the assets that should

supervised administration.
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be subject

to

9.

There is a reasonable interpretation of the Will

that will include all of the decedents real and personal property
within the dispositive provisions of the Will.
10.

The testator in paragraph NINTH of the Will stated

his express intent to make no provision for his son Ryan W.
Scarritt for the reason that Ryan was or would be well provided for
under the Will of Horace S. Scarritt.

That intent is crystal

clear, and were the Court to find that Mr. Scarritt intended to die
intestate, it would be in direct contravention of the express
provisions of paragraph NINTH of the Will.
11.

In paragraph

THIRD

of

the

Will,

the testator

expressed his intent to dispose of all real or personal property
which he might possess at the time of his death, with the exception
of the Horace S. Scarritt Trust.
12.

Paragraph THIRD of the Will clearly provides that

the testator

intended to give individual bequests to certain

parties who are listed in subsections A, B, C, D, and E.l.
13.

As expressed in paragraph THIRD, and as demonstrated

by the entirety of the Will, the testator intended subsection E.2.
as a residuary clause to dispose of any and all personal property
in the estate which had not been disposed of by specific bequest
in the Will.
14.

In subsection E.2., the testator intended to create

a power of appointment in a committee of three persons, Curtiss S.
Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton, the personal representative, and
James M. Park, Attorney at Law and author of the Will.
-3-

It is

significant that the testator included in this committee two of his
close personal friends and his son Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.
15.

The testator intended that the committee of three

have power to dispose of all items of personal property remaining
in the estate after the specific bequests set out in the Will were
satisfied.
16.

As expressed in paragraph FIFTH of the Will, the

testator intended that any estate taxes charged against assets
passing under the Will should be paid as a debt of the estate
rather than be paid by the devisees.
17.

Although paragraph SIXTH of the Will again provides

for a specific bequest of certain items of personal property, the
court finds that paragraph SIXTH is simply misplaced in the Will.
The testator obviously intended paragraph SIXTH as an additional
individual bequest, subject to the specific individual bequests
made in paragraph THIRD.
18.

The fact that the additional individual bequest made

in paragraph SIXTH of the Will is contained in a separate paragraph
from paragraph THIRD does not indicate that the testator intended
subsection E.2. of paragraph THIRD to be anything other than a
residuary personal property clause.
19.

It was the intention of the testator, as expressed

in paragraph SEVENTH of the Will, that his real property in Virgin,
Utah be sold and that his personal representative have reasonable
discretion and latitude in deciding how and when to accomplish the
sale in order to maximize the price.
-4-
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20.

The

testator

also

intended

that

the

personal

representative borrow monies against his real property in Virgin,
Utah for the purpose of paying the estate taxes and that the
remaining proceeds of the sale of the real property be disposed of
according to the Will, namely, by the committee of three empowered
in paragraph THIRD, subsection E.2., to dispose of all residual
personal property.
21.

In paragraph SEVENTH of the Will there is a catch-

all phrase authorizing the personal representative to sell all real
property and all tangible personal property and livestock which are
included in his estate and not previously disposed of pursuant to
paragraphs THIRD and SIXTH of the Will.

This phrase does not

indicate that the testator knew certain items would be missed by
the THIRD and SIXTH paragraphs of the Will.

Rather, the Court

views this statement as a boilerplate catch-all phrase intended to
apply to anything that the testator may have forgotten about or
anything that may have slipped through the provisions of paragraphs
THIRD and SIXTH due to a dispute as to the character of the
property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangible.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

resolution

of

the

issues

contained

in

the

Petition of Ryan W. Scarritt depends upon the construction this
Court gives to the Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S. Scarritt.
2.
and

against

There is a strong presumption in favor of testacy
intestacy.

The

petitioner

bears

the

burden

of

demonstrating that the only reasonable interpretation of the Will
-5-

leads

to

a

finding

interpretation
intestacy,

the

of

intestacy.

of the Will which
Court

is

If there

is a

reasonable

leads to testacy rather than

obligated

to

adopt

the

reasonable

interpretation leading to a finding of testacy.
3.

The intent of the testator governs these proceedings

so far as that intent is demonstrated by the contents of the Will.
4.

Resort to extrinsic evidence is permitted only when

the testator attempts to state his intention in the Will but does
so ambiguously.

Resort to extrinsic evidence is then permitted in

an attempt to clarify his intention.
5.

Resort to extrinsic evidence is not permitted to

supply terms or provisions which were omitted from the Will.
6.

Resort to extrinsic evidence is unnecessary in these

proceedings, because the testator's intent is clearly expressed in
the Will.
7.

While there are certain technical problems with the

way the Will was constructed, such as the order of its provisions
and the construction of paragraph THIRD, these technical problems
should not be applied in such a hypercritical fashion as to defeat
the obvious intent of the testator.
8.

There is a reasonable interpretation of the Will

that will include all of the property in the Curtiss S. Scarritt
estate within the dispositive provisions of the Will.
9.
personal

The testator made specific individual bequests of

property

to

the

parties

listed

in

paragraph

THIRD,

subsections A, B, C, D, and E.l.
-6d* £&

10.

Subsection E.2. of paragraph THIRD constitutes a

residuary clause to dispose of any and all personal property in
the estate which had not been disposed of by specific bequest in
the Will.
11.

Subsection E.2. of paragraph THIRD creates a valid

power of appointment in a committee of three persons, Curtiss S.
Scarritt, Jr., Rodney K. Orton, the personal representative, and
James M. Park, Attorney at Law and author of the Will, to dispose
of all items of personal property remaining in the estate after the
specific bequests set out in the Will have been satisfied.
12.

Paragraph FOURTH of the Will appoints Rodney K.

Orton to act as personal representative without bond.
13.

Paragraph FIFTH of the Will directs that any estate

taxes charged against the assets passing under the Will be paid as
a debt of the estate, without apportionment, rather than be paid
by the devisees.
14.
additional

Paragraph

individual

SIXTH
bequest

of
of

property, subject to the specific
paragraph THIRD.

the

Will

certain

establishes

items

of

an

personal

individual bequests made in

This bequest is simply misplaced in the Will and

does not indicate that subsection E.2. of paragraph THIRD was not
intended as a residuary clause.
15.

Paragraph SEVENTH of the Will establishes the method

for payment of the debts of the estate, including estate taxes.
Paragraph SEVENTH directs the personal representative to borrow
monies against the decedent's considerable real property located
-7-

in Virgin, Utah and to keep that operation running until such time
as the personal representative can with all prudence sell the
property.
16.

Paragraph SEVENTH of the Will directs the personal

representative to sell the decedent's real property, but gives the
personal representative reasonable discretion

and

latitude in

deciding how and when to accomplish the sale in order to maximize
the price.
17.

Paragraph SEVENTH of the Will directs the personal

representative to add the proceeds of the sale of decedent's real
property to the estate for use in paying the debts of the estate
including estate taxes.

The remaining proceeds are to be placed

into the hands of the committee of three for disposition, in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph THIRD.
18.

Paragraph NINTH directs that none of the decedent's

estate pass to his son, Ryan W. Scarritt, for the reason that Ryan
has been or will be well provided for under the Will of Horace S.
Scarritt.

Ryan W. Scarritt therefore takes nothing under the

decedent's Will.
19.

The decedent

personal property

under

disposed

the Will

of

and

all

of his real and

therefore

intestate as to any portion of his estate.

did

not die

Any residue of his

estate not specifically devised passes under the residuary clause
of paragraph THIRD, subsection E.2.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Last Will and Testament of Curtiss S. Scarritt, dated May 29, 1991,
is hereby formally probated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
administration of the estate shall be supervised, subject to later
modification upon specific motion to limit the assets subject to
supervision.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all of
the decedent's assets shall pass to his successors-in-interest
under the express provisions of the Will.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
estate taxes for all assets passing under the Will shall be paid
as a debt, without apportionment, and not be charged against the
interests of the devisees under the Will.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
petition of Ryan W. Scarritt for a declaration of partial intestacy
is hereby denied.
The Court certifies under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure that this Order constitutes a final, appealable
order as to the petitions of Ryan W. Scarritt for formal probate
of the Will, construction of the Will, and declaration of partial
intestacy.

These estate proceedings involve multiple interested

parties and multiple claims on the estate.

This Order finally

adjudicates the petitions of Ryan W. Scarritt for formal probate
of the Will, construction of the Will, and declaration of partial

-9-

intestacy and disposes of any claim that Ryan W. Scarritt may have
in the decedent's estate.
The Court further finds that there is no just reason for
delaying an appeal of these matters.
work

injustice

to

all parties

Delaying appeal would only

involved,

since

the

personal

representative cannot prudently distribute certain assets from the
estate while any question remains regarding the petitioner's
claims.

The Court directs entry of judgment in favor of Ryan W.

Scarritt on his petition for formal probate of the Will. The Court
directs entry of judgment against Ryan W. Scarritt and in favor of
the

personal

representative

on

the petitioner's

request for

construction of the Will and declaration of partial intestacy.
All other interested parties with notice of these proceedings are
likewise bound by this final order and judgment.
To the extent that this Order grants the petition for
supervised administration, the Order is non-final and subject to
revision on specific motion, as indicated above.
DATED this £5 -

day o f ^ W ^ i ^ ^

, 1991.

&<s44

J./^hilip Eve^"
Presiding District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^Oy-zXday of September, 1991,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing' proposed order was served
on each of the following, by depositing a copy in the United States
Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:
David Nuffer, Esq.
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
Attorneys for Ryan W. Scarritt
90 East 200 North
P.O. Box 400
St. George, UT 84771-0400
Russell J. Gallian, Esq.
GALLIAN & WESTFALL
Attorneys for Betsy Cheney
One South Main
Box 3 67
St. George, UT 84771
Thomas Taylor, Esq.
Attorney for Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.
P.O. Box 429
Santa Rosa, CA 95402
Pete Heaton
Virgin, UT 84779
Milly Heaton
Virgin, UT 84779
Angel Nolasco
Virgin, UT 84779
Don Randall
13 0 North 100 East
Washington, UT 84780
Sigma Nu Fraternity
Beta Omicron Chapter
University of the South
Sewanee, TN 37375-4004
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of

ORDER CERTIFYING MEMORANDUM
DECISION UNDER RULE 54 (b)

CURTISS S. SCARRITT,
Deceased.

Probate No. 913500084

Petitioner Ryan W. Scarritt has moved that the Court's "Memorandum of
Decision" entered September 5,1991, be certified under Rule 54 (b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. That rule provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment.
In this probate action, there are many claims and issues to be determined, such
as the claims of creditors, confirmations of sales and approval of distributions of
property. The Court's Memorandum of Decision disposes of the claimed rights of
Petitioner Ryan W. Scarritt as an intestate heir. Therefore, it represents a final
determination by this Court of those issues. The issues were fully briefed and
extensively argued. The Court's determination of those issues will not change as the
administration of the estate proceeds.

Therefore, the Court
a.

expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and

b.

expressly directs the entry of its judgment, already stated in the

Memorandum Decision, that the decedent died testate as to all his property and
that Ryan W. Scarritt stands to inherit nothing from the estate of Curtiss S.
Scarritt.
The date of this order shall be the date upon which the Memorandum Decision
is final for purposes of Rule 54(b).
DATED THIS<g£_-day of
BY THE COURT

J. I^HILIP EVES
District Court Judge

, 1991

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of September, 1991, I served an
unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER CERTIFYING MEMORANDUM DECISION
UNDER RULE 54 (b) on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail,
postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Michael W. Park, Esq.
P. O. Box 2438
St. George, UT 84770

Milly Heaton
Virgin, UT 84770

Michael M. Later, Esq.
Gregory M. Hess, Esq.

Angel Nolasco
Virgin, UT 84779

KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

Attorneys for Rodney K. Orton
185 South State Street, Suite 1300

P.O. Box 11019

Don Randall
130 North 100 East
Washington, UT 84780

Salt Lake City, UT 84147
Russell J. Gallian, Esq.
Thomas Taylor, Esq.
Attorney for Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.
P.O. Box 429
Santa Rosa, CA 95402
Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.
2340 Sycamore Ave.
Santa Rosa, CA 95404
Pete Heaton
Virgin, UT 84779

GALLIAN & WESTFALL

Attorneys for Betsy Cheney
One South Main
Box 367
St. George, UT 84771
Sigma Nu Fraternity
Beta Omicron Chapter
University of the South
Sewanee, TN 37375-4004
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of September, 1991, I served a
signed copy of the foregoing ORDER CERTIFYING MEMORANDUM DECISION
UNDER RULE 54 (b) on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail,
postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Michael W. Park, Esq.
P. O. Box 2438
St. George, UT 84770

Milly Heaton
Virgin, UT 84779

Michael M. Later, Esq.
Gregory M. Hess, Esq.

Angel Nolasco
Virgin, UT 84779

KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

Attorneys for Rodney K. Orton
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 84147

Don Randall
130 North 100 East
Washington, UT 84780

Thomas Taylor, Esq.
Attorney for Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.
P.O. Box 429
Santa Rosa, CA 95402

GALLIAN & WESTFALL

Russell J. Gallian, Esq.

Curtiss S. Scarritt, Jr.
2340 Sycamore Ave.
Santa Rosa, CA 95404
Pete Heaton
Virgin, UT 84779

Attorneys for Betsy Cheney
One South Main
Box 367
St. George, UT 84771
Sigma Nu Fraternity
Beta Omicron Chapter
University of the South
Sewanee, TN 37375-4004
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Will of Curtiss S. Scarritt

Addendum Item Number 4

Wa#i3B$tfl

^ ^ s ? f ctttrim*

CURTISS

, CAi'. ITT

;i p I "in

,h 1 | vi" "' M! i ry In, County of

Washington

. jte of Utah and being ovc: the age ot eighteen years

and being of sound »r^

nosing mind 2nd memory and not acting
,1 portion whomsoevi 1

D hereby make,

.

11. \

Testamer^ * •** *

- •. (*

,:s to be ray Last Will and

**"*" f^i-'W'
it. ^

and Codicils norotofoie

i- ,
. .

SKrnvn:

y

nny nnrl 111 1 tnrnmr Wills
> ..e.
- body

1 cremated and the onhes

•x • o do* . 'Lined by wnere my deatn taKes place.

7

JIG.**

easonab;v

.-

empower

v Executor

r!:both

j.cai

*-. rhc* ;o£>'
emu personal,

convenient; and 1 nereby authorize -nd
t ~nv- r* ^ ^ maae agains* ~- estate,

, remamcer

. . .f, estate,

of "h^Tc^ver

horesoever the same* m a ^ be si~~-_w~ .1 ;,.__. - ~*:o.

3
^3-«ad

,„r possessed * . <;.*!..... ^n any wav . ,T.av oe entitled ct the time of
ray deatl

.:i., - < " trtion ui the Horace S. Scarritt Trust which

shall be administered by a Trust Officer of Banker's Trust, New
York, New York, I give, devise, and bequeath as follows:
A.

Certificates

of

Deposit

totaling

approximately

$150,000.00 which are presently in the possession of Lois
Iverson shall be distributed as follows:

B.

1.

20% to Pete Heaton;

2.

20% to Milly Heaton;

3.

20% to Angel Nolasco

4.

40% to Don Randall

The sums from the Ferguson Capital Account shall be

disbursed as follows:
1.

The sum of $2,000.00 per month to Betsy Cheney
of

Lake

City

Colorado,

until

the

funds

remaining in said account are distributed as
set forth in paragraph 3.
2.

The sum of $10,000.00 shall be delivered to the
BETA OMICRON Chapter of the SIGMA NU FRATERNITY
at the University of South, Sewanee, Tennessee.

3.

The remaining funds received from the Ferguson
Capital Account

should be divided

equally

between Betsy Cheney of Lake City Colorado and
Curtiss

S. Scarritt,

Jr., of Santa Rosa,

California.
C.

All race horse related livestock and vehicles shall

be given to Don Randall.
D.

All other livestock and saddle horses shall be given

i

Pete Heaton.

c•

personal property should be divided as :ol*cv:.s;
"

II!'" Il M i l

II

B I a<

'

":°.rr' Set

and

o

4-10 shotgun.
2.

'Phii d i s t r i b u t i o n
p e i" s u 11» J 1

of

the

11 J. M i > o i

11

Curtiss S. Scarritt,
m

Jame~ '
FOURTH

..,:u^

remaining
11 i

items

11 H I"

P

uf

Jr., Rodney K. Orton -. :J

-ir

..

Orton, t : ac* as my personal representative or :\\

^statt

- •J ^ r r *•**•* necessity r-f giving bon..
f_ V i* ; t

UIldt

**JunO y

ne

cannot

reiser,

11 "il"

11111 r ni if"' 11i

• :.

-J _fcji o t;

or

doe

,-eisona!

.*-•**

irnolnt

Tamer

'

-

pezsonai repiesoniati 1 . necessity ot giving oonc.
M„

. . — i - e c r i r n with the administration of my estate anc

the excCuCiw., ^i

.,;-J::

herein

<JUIII»»I

LMI, I IIILU"

Representat:vo ?: foilcwsI
" ""TTi, succession, eo*'3to

1.
^,.4-,, ^^ 4--»

<_. . . __ , . a come D a u i . . . ;_, L*

transfer

- " ?c*y or

:

law or in respect to any property -:r interest passing unaer t m s ,
, i • '.tpurpose

IIAH

oi

including

i 1 nn H Testament
determining

'*'

-^^IM^O

•*? ^^rat^

for thf*

I in.' amount

.ny nun, payable as interest

-*: penalty eecause or any
-.r*- thereof, shalx

be paid out of or charged against my Utah estate in the manner
hereinabove

provided,

as

if

it

were

a

debt

and

without

apportionment.
2.

Dividends

and

distributions,

whether

ordinary

or

extraordinary, which are received upon securities of corporations
or associations, including wasting asset for investment companies,
shall be allocated to income principal as hereinafter set forth,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary:

(1)

If

received in cash or if receivable in cash, at the option of the
stockholder, to income;

(2) If received in stock of the declarer

of any class, to principal;

(3)

If received in any security or

property, other than the foregoing, to income, to the extent
charged against earnings of the declarer, whenever earned, and the
balance to principal

(4) Not withstanding the foregoing, if paid

in whole or partial liquidation of the declarer, to principal.
My Personal Representative shall have full discretion to
resolve any dbubt concerning the application of the foregoing
directions and to allocate, between income and principal, any
receipt as to which provision is not herein made and their decision
shall be conclusive against all persons interested in my estate or
in any trust created hereunder,
3.

In case any Personal Representative or trustees shall

invest in any bonds or similar securities and shall pay therefor
a premium in addition to the par value thereof, they may but shall
not be required to, provide a sinking fund, from the income of such
investments,

to

absorb

such premium
4

for the benefit

of the

remaindermen h*:t, i~
purchased

'•"he case ~i any such security

l>-.--*

-m

.•

the. -

• " .y

i

I.he fact or par value

-purities issued, or cusromari I

bougnt sna

.oia .... . -*scoun: ^uJis, such executors ox

shall v 1 - :r^at an" - m

SIXTH:
JR,

a

juquliwil

/:t anv crcfit realized upon the sale c

.:vt .:.. , ,.-,,. ath to ^V son, . , _ * _

ibsolu^ly

:-' ~e

-'irvives

articles

person-'

houi .
.~y ..tan estate at, my aeatn. ^w.uuiaj only such oi L-W*.-.,O ^.. . «"
mnchin^r- "y

^'iipmerr

;t

».ih noises and other

-.ivestou.
.tributed pursuant * : the provisions
SEVEN"

whatever

: \rticle THIR

* erpb" direct: rr.y Personal Representative to borrc,

sums

are

trrase?'"**:- <— ^- -

necessary

:cr

tne

. .axntendnct

:-•-* in Virgin, '.tar. .:n<; i_.c

tpKeep

ana

-::u salaries oi

r/f time *.•::!'.". snal - oe left to the sole discreatiun or r^ persona.
representat

*<-.

'*

;• M -- borrowed against the real propert

properr\

uuthonze IT? 1-ersoi.a" representative

rropertT-

-^v^r-

angible

personal

pursuant r: Articles 'I'HI^D and SIXTH hereoi.

, :-t,L- u~ a ; ec
.,-; :

: :>

j.:n time or twines

ana upuii ouun uerms and conditions as s:*a*I uee«i advisable and to

add the proceeds of any sucn sale "to my estate.
EIGHTH:

This will shall be probated subject to the laws of

the State of Utah.
NINTH:

I make no provision herein for my ex-wife, Donna Lynn

Scarritt, for reasons well known to her.

I make no provision for

my son, Ryan Winthrop Scarritt, for the reason that he will be
well-provided for, following my death, under the will of my father,
Horace S. Scarritt.
TENTH:

I request my Utah Personal Representative to consult

with and be guided by the advice of my friends of THE PARK FIRM,
in the selection and distribution of my real and personal property.
I, Curtiss S. Scarritt, the Testatrix, siga my name to this
instrument this

£°l

day of MA, \J

t 1991, and being first duly

sworn, do declare to the undersigned authority that I sign and
execute this instrument as my Last Will and Testament, and that I
sign it willingly, that I executed it as my free and voluntary act,
for the purposes expressed in it, and that I am eighteen years of
age or older, of sound mind and under no constraint or undue
influence•
tj

CURTISS S. SCARRITT

We, L^qfr* ThmnpSCr/)

and LtCil

Lts

. the witnesses, sign

our names to this instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby
declare to the undersigned authority that the Testatrix signs and
executes this instrument* as his Last Will and Testament, that he
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of age or older, of sound mind, and undei no constraint or unduu
influence.
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